Age-related differences in strategic competition by Horn, Sebastian S et al.








Age-related differences in strategic competition
Horn, Sebastian S ; Avrahami, Judith ; Kareev, Yaakov ; Hertwig, Ralph
Abstract: Understanding how people of different ages decide in competition is a question of theoretical
and practical importance. Using an experimental laboratory approach, this research investigates the
ability of younger and older adults to think and act strategically with equal or unequal resources. In
zero-sum games of resource allocation, younger adults (19-35 years) and older adults (65-81 years) made
strategic decisions in competition against opponents of a similar age (Study 1; N = 120) or different
age (Study 2; N = 120). The findings highlight people’s ability to make good interpersonal decisions
in complex scenarios: Both younger and older adults were aware of their relative strength (in terms of
material resources) and allocated their resources adaptively. When competing against opponents of a
similar age, people’s gains were in line with game-theoretic predictions. However, younger adults made
superior strategic allocations and won more frequently when competing against older adults. Measures
of fluid cognitive and numerical abilities correlated with strategic behavior in interpersonal competition.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-94626-2






The following work is licensed under a Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
License.
Originally published at:
Horn, Sebastian S; Avrahami, Judith; Kareev, Yaakov; Hertwig, Ralph (2021). Age-related differences in




Scientific Reports |        (2021) 11:15318  | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-94626-2
www.nature.com/scientificreports
Age‑related differences in strategic 
competition
Sebastian S. Horn1,2*, Judith Avrahami3, Yaakov Kareev3 & Ralph Hertwig2
Understanding how people of different ages decide in competition is a question of theoretical and 
practical importance. Using an experimental laboratory approach, this research investigates the 
ability of younger and older adults to think and act strategically with equal or unequal resources. In 
zero‑sum games of resource allocation, younger adults (19–35 years) and older adults (65–81 years) 
made strategic decisions in competition against opponents of a similar age (Study 1; N = 120) or 
different age (Study 2; N = 120). The findings highlight people’s ability to make good interpersonal 
decisions in complex scenarios: Both younger and older adults were aware of their relative strength 
(in terms of material resources) and allocated their resources adaptively. When competing against 
opponents of a similar age, people’s gains were in line with game‑theoretic predictions. However, 
younger adults made superior strategic allocations and won more frequently when competing against 
older adults. Measures of fluid cognitive and numerical abilities correlated with strategic behavior in 
interpersonal competition.
Much political and economic power is concentrated in the hands of older adults: with a median age of 63 years, 
influential leaders and businesspeople are older than most citizens in their countries, according to a Forbes rank-
ing of the “world’s most powerful people”1. Due to demographic transitions in many industrialized countries, 
the proportion of older adults who make strategic political, financial, and other decisions is set to increase even 
 further2. An important class of strategic decisions involves competition, in which the competing parties can 
invest limited and different amounts of resources to achieve their goals (i.e., David-Goliath scenarios). That is, 
humans and other animals compete for survival, prosperity, or standing—but the means available for competi-
tion may differ dramatically. It is therefore a pertinent question whether and how people’s strategic allocation 
decisions differ as a function of age and with the material resources they hold. Yet surprisingly little research has 
addressed how individual differences (e.g., declining cognitive abilities in old age) may impact the outcome of 
competitions. In this article, we compare strategic allocation decisions by people of different ages when endowed 
with the same or different amounts of material resources.
The preference to compete (competitiveness) appears to differ with age. Mayr et al.3, for instance, found that 
competitiveness follows an inverted U-shaped pattern across adulthood with a peak in the fifties. However, little 
is known about age differences in strategic performance in competitions, in which a decision maker and other 
agents are mutually affected by their choices (cf.4–9). The main goal of our research was therefore to investigate 
younger and older adults’ interpersonal decisions in a game-theoretically formalized competition that requires 
strategic allocations.
Strategic resource allocation
We study strategic allocations in competition with the Colonel Blotto  game10. In this classic two-person zero-sum 
game, players simultaneously distribute their material resources (“troops”) across a set of fields (“battlefields”); 
battles are then waged over all or a subset of the fields. The game models many real-world situations in which 
competitors face the challenge of allocating their limited resources wisely to maximize their chances of success 
across different dimensions relevant to a competition (e.g., distributing funds in political campaigns; advertising 
across localities; economic investments). The Colonel Blotto game has been studied both  theoretically11–14 and 
 experimentally15–17. We investigated a variant of the game in which two players privately allocated their resources 
across a fixed number of fields. The players were endowed with either equal or unequal resources at the outset. 
Competition was then resolved over one randomly selected field and the player who allocated more resources 
on that field won the round. To preview the gist of game-theoretic  reasoning12,18, players endowed with more 
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resources (stronger players) should allocate resources following a uniform distribution on each field on which 
competition may occur. Players endowed with fewer resources (weaker players) should strategically concentrate 
their resources on fewer fields, abandoning some fields altogether in order to effectively compete with stronger 
players on the remaining fields (see section Game-Theoretic Benchmarks for details).
Aging and strategic competition
How does aging affect competition that requires strategic interaction? We investigated three hypotheses. First, 
according to the declining-strategic-cognition hypothesis, performance in complex competitive games requires 
fluid cognitive and numerical abilities, which decline with age (e.g.,19–21). In line with this, prior findings indicate 
that differences in decision quality are often mediated by fluid cognitive abilities—particularly when tasks are 
complex and  demanding22. The decline-in-strategic-cognition hypothesis would predict that older adults have 
more difficulties than younger adults to apply effective strategies in the competition game and play less system-
atically. Specifically, older adults may have more difficulties than younger adults to adaptively concentrate their 
resources on fewer fields as the weaker players and to cover all fields as the stronger players.
A second hypothesis suggests that younger and older adults differ in strategic allocations not because of their 
cognitive abilities—but because preferences may change with age. In many decision contexts, older adults tend 
to focus on accuracy and on preventing errors (e.g.,23), suggesting that aging gives rise to a cautious mindset. 
Moreover, aging has been associated with a decline in self-reported risk  taking24. In the Colonel Blotto game, a 
lower propensity to take risks would mean that people avoid losing on fields by leaving them empty, but instead 
follow a risk-diversification strategy. The increasing-cautiousness hypothesis therefore suggests that older adults 
generally allocate resources more evenly than younger adults. The first two hypotheses predict age-related decline 
in strategic performance—but postulate different underlying mechanisms.
A third hypothesis suggests that older adults perform as well as (or possibly better) than younger adults in 
the Colonel Blotto game because they may be able to co-opt strategies that have proven valuable for dealing with 
limited and declining resources in general. Prior research indicates that lifelong experience helps older adults to 
approach problems pragmatically and wisely (e.g.,25). As people age, experiences of limitations and loss become 
increasingly pervasive in various domains of  life26. It has been suggested that successful aging involves strate-
gies of life management, including selectivity, which help older adults to deal with losses and allocate remaining 
resources  efficiently27. As resources become more constrained, strategic selection can help older adults to reduce 
the number of options across which their resources are spread. The successful-selection hypothesis therefore 
predicts that older adults adopt a less-is-more strategy in the Colonel Blotto game, particularly as the weaker 
players. That is, older adults may selectively invest their limited resources across fewer fields and subsequently 
perform as well as (or possibly even better than) younger adults.
We examined these hypotheses in two studies in which participants competed for real money, based on their 
strategic allocations. In both studies, participants were randomly assigned to compete against opponents whose 
resources were unequal (asymmetric condition) or equal (symmetric condition) to their own. In Study 1, younger 
and older adults played multiple rounds of the Colonel Blotto game against opponents of a similar age. In Study 
2, younger adults played the same version of the game against older adults.
Study 1
Study 1 addressed the following research questions: Do people make systematic allocations in the Colonel Blotto 
game? How tuned are younger and older players to their strength relative to that of their opponents? How fre-
quently do weaker players win in asymmetric competition? Are those wins in line with game-theoretic expecta-
tions? Finally, we examined the relation between cognitive abilities and strategic performance.
Method. Participants. Participants in Study 1 were 60 younger and 60 older community-dwelling adults. In 
Study 1, each session involved homogeneous age groups of either younger or older adults. Participant character-
istics and measures of fluid cognitive abilities, knowledge, affective state, numeracy, risk taking, and social value 
orientation are reported in Tables 1 and 2. The Supplemental Online Materials include further information about 
the test scales used in the current studies. All participants were paid volunteers, provided informed consent, and 
were recruited through local advertisements or from a database maintained by the research institute.
All experiments and procedures were approved by an ethics committee at the Max-Planck-Institute for 
Human Development Berlin and were performed in accordance with the relevant guidelines and regulations.
Design. The game was introduced as a competition involving the allocation of points across several fields. The 
number of points a player could allocate in any given round (a player’s “strength”) changed from 48 to 96 points 
(or vice versa) halfway through the game; strength was manipulated within participants and counterbalanced 
(tests of the impact of order of available points in the game, i.e., 96–48 vs. 48–96 points, are in Supplemental 
Materials and did not indicate any significant main effects or interactions with other variables of interest). In 
each session participants were either of equal strength (symmetric control groups) or of unequal strength (asym-
metric groups). In the asymmetric groups, half of the players were randomly assigned to be the stronger player 
(96 points) and the other half to be the weaker player (48 points). In order to have the same number of players 
facing opponents of equal strength, greater strength, and lesser strength in any between-subject comparison, the 
number of asymmetric groups was twice that of the number of symmetric groups (i.e., n = 80 players in asym-
metric competition and n = 40 in symmetric competition). Including symmetric groups allowed us to disentan-
gle the potential effects of the absolute number of points available from effects of the difference in points (relative 
strength) between the two opponents. Study 1 thus involved a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed design with age group (younger or 
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older adults) and opponent strength (symmetric or asymmetric groups) as between-subject factors and available 
resources (48 or 96 points) as within-subjects factor.
Procedures and materials. Groups of four players per session were seated in separate booths in the same labora-
tory room. Participants first read instruction slides on the computer screen describing the procedures and the 
structure of the allocation game. They were informed that they would compete against the other participants 
through connected computers and that this would be the only way of social interaction during the game. A 
trained experimenter also explained the game rules. Participants then completed a few practice rounds that 
were not incentivized to familiarize themselves with the procedures and had the opportunity to ask questions. 
They then played an incentivized version of the game (see Fig. 1): Each round involved a competition between 
two opponents who had to fully allocate their available resources (shown in a jar on the left side of the screen) 
as they saw fit across four fields by adjusting four corresponding sliders and then clicking on a “next” button. 
There was no time restriction for these allocation decisions. Once both players had made their allocations, the 
program randomly selected one of the four fields with equal probability, and the points allocated to that field by 
each opponent were displayed and compared. The player with more points on that field won €0.20; in the case 
of a tie, both players received €0.10. The game was repeated for a total of 25 rounds (with random rematching 
of opponents), followed by a short break. Participants were then informed that their available points per round 
would now change from 48 to 96 points (or vice versa). The game then continued for another 25 rounds. Each 
participant could earn a performance-contingent bonus of up to €10, depending on the number of wins. Finally, 
participants completed a battery of tests and questionnaires. Verbatim instructions and details of procedures are 
provided in Supplemental Materials.
Results. In all analyses, the alpha level was set to 0.050. Sample-size planning was based on power analysis, 
which showed that 120 participants per study were sufficient to detect interaction effects between age groups and 
experimental factors of size η2p = 0.04 with a power of 0.96 (further details are in the Supplemental Materials). CIs 
for effect sizes (d and η2p ) were obtained using noncentral t and F distributions. We did not exclude any partici-
pants or trials from the analyses. Before presenting the empirical results, we first consider the game-theoretic 
benchmarks of the Colonel Blotto game.
Table 1.  Sociodemographic characteristics of participants in studies 1 and 2. Wealth = estimated overall 
current assets minus overall debts in € (95% of participants provided information about wealth).
Younger adults Older adults
Study 1
N 60 60
Age in years (mean/range) 26.6/19–35 70.4/65–80
Sex (female/male) 34/26 29/31
Education: Completed …
 Elementary school 5 23
 High school 20 7
 University/college 35 30
Wealth
 < €5000 24 10
 €5000–€10,000 10 3
 €10,000–€100,000 22 24
 > €100,000 3 20
Study 2
N 60 60
Age in years (mean/range) 24.1/19–31 71.3/67–81
Sex (female/male) 31/29 31/29
Education: completed …
 Elementary school 5 19
 High school 35 4
 University/college 20 37
Wealth
 < €5000 26 13
 €5000–€10,000 9 4
 €10,000–€100,000 11 21
 > €100,000 11 17
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Game-theoretic benchmarks. Finding a good approach to maximize success in the Colonel Blotto game is chal-
lenging. Given k fields and m1 and m2 resources available to two competitors, respectively, (with m1 ≥ m2 > 0), the 
strategy of dividing m1 resources equally among all fields could be easily foiled by an opponent simply allocating 
m1
k
+ 1 resources to as many fields as possible. Competitors should therefore avoid predictability and use mixed 
strategies instead, where players choose from beneficial distributions of strategies (i.e., no pure Nash equilibria 
exist for the  game12,18). Game-theoretic analyses suggest that, to maximize wins, a player in a symmetric compe-
tition and a stronger player in an asymmetric competition should allocate resources following a uniform distri-







 . In contrast, a weaker player should leave a proportion of 1 − m2
m1
 fields empty to retain a chance of 
winning against a stronger opponent and allocate resources on the remaining fields following the strategy rec-
ommended for stronger  players12.
Did players’ allocations differ from random play? In a Colonel Blotto game with k battlefields and m available 
points (resources), players can select from 
(
m + k − 1
k − 1
)
 strategies or allocation  patterns28. In the present stud-





= 156, 849 strategies at their disposal for 
allocating the points across k = 4 fields. This large strategy space makes it practically impossible for humans to 
Table 2.  Test scales scores and actual wins for younger adults, older adults, and age-group comparisons. 
Actual wins = observed proportion of wins out of 25 rounds. Details of the test scales used in both studies are 





M SD M SD Effect size d 95% CI p
Study 1
Test scales
 Crystallized abilities (0–37) 31.13 3.01 33.30 2.35 − 0.80 [− 1.17, − 0.43] < 0.001
 Fluid abilities: speed (0–133) 86.55 15.38 57.68 12.86 2.04 [+ 1.59, + 2.48] < 0.001
 Fluid abilities: reasoning (0–15) 11.82 1.81 7.70 2.91 1.70 [+ 1.27, + 2.13] < 0.001
 Numeracy (0–11) 9.52 1.32 7.88 2.79 0.75 [+ 0.37, + 1.12] < 0.001
 Positive affect: before game (1–5) 2.99 0.59 3.18 0.64 − 0.30 [− 0.66, + 0.06] 0.101
 Negative affect: before game (1–5) 1.30 0.43 1.18 0.24 0.36 [− 0.00, + 0.72] 0.052
 Positive affect: after game (1–5) 3.02 0.72 3.35 0.87 − 0.42 [− 0.78, − 0.05] 0.025
 Negative affect: after game (1–5) 1.19 0.26 1.07 0.14 0.55 [+ 0.19, + 0.92] 0.003
 Risk taking (0–10) 4.95 1.89 5.80 2.23 − 0.41 [− 0.77, − 0.05] 0.027
 Social value orientation 28.35 11.34 21.02 15.66 0.54 [+ 0.16, + 0.91] 0.005
Actual wins
 48 vs. 48 (symmetric) 0.50 0.11 0.50 0.12 – – –
 96 vs. 96 (symmetric) 0.50 0.08 0.50 0.10 – – –
 48 vs. 96 (asymmetric, weaker) 0.27 0.08 0.25 0.08 0.25 [− 0.19, + 0.69] 0.260
 96 vs. 48 (asymmetric, stronger) 0.73 0.08 0.75 0.09 − 0.24 [− 0.68, + 0.20] 0.282
Study 2
Test scales
 Crystallized abilities (0–37) 30.77 2.59 33.45 1.88 − 1.19 [− 1.58, − 0.79] < 0.001
 Fluid abilities: speed (0–133) 86.17 16.38 60.68 13.07 1.72 [+ 1.29, + 2.14] < 0.001
 Fluid abilities: reasoning (0–15) 11.52 1.95 7.88 2.13 1.78 [+ 1.35, + 2.20] < 0.001
 Numeracy (0–11) 9.50 1.51 7.43 2.79 0.92 [+ 0.54, + 1.30] < 0.001
 Positive affect: before game (1–5) 2.95 0.56 3.24 0.61 − 0.50 [− 0.86, − 0.13] 0.007
 Negative affect: before game (1–5) 1.32 0.33 1.18 0.23 0.50 [+ 0.14, + 0.86] 0.007
 Positive affect: after game (1–5) 2.97 0.68 3.35 0.71 − 0.55 [− 0.91, − 0.18] 0.003
 Negative affect: after game (1–5) 1.25 0.34 1.19 0.31 0.19 [− 0.17, + 0.54] 0.314
 Risk taking (0–10) 4.88 1.66 5.84 2.15 − 0.50 [− 0.87, − 0.12] 0.009
 Social value orientation 25.00 13.74 21.88 16.04 0.21 [− 0.16, + 0.57] 0.263
Actual wins
 48 vs. 48 (symmetric) 0.56 0.11 0.44 0.11 1.08 [+ 0.41, + 1.74] 0.002
 96 vs. 96 (symmetric) 0.52 0.11 0.48 0.11 0.34 [− 0.29, + 0.96] 0.291
 48 vs. 96 (asymmetric, weaker) 0.26 0.07 0.22 0.08 0.55 [+ 0.10, + 1.00] 0.016
 96 vs. 48 (asymmetric, stronger) 0.78 0.08 0.74 0.10 0.45 [+ 0.002, 0.89] 0.049
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consider and evaluate all possible strategies. One possibility is therefore that players distribute their points ran-
domly across the fields due to the extreme complexity of the game. Random allocation might also be more pro-
nounced in older than in younger adults (e.g., if decline in fluid cognitive abilities reduce strategically systematic 
play). Figure 2 shows random and game-theoretically optimal allocations (panels a–b), as well as participants’ 
actual allocations as a function of age, available points, and opponent strength (panels c–f). As can be seen, the 
actual allocations observed in both studies did not resemble the simulated random distributions. Instead, people 
distributed their points more uniformly and frequently allocated nothing to a field—a pattern that is very 
unlikely under random play. This finding suggests that neither younger nor older adults employed a random 
allocation strategy.
Allocation of resources. The distributions of allocations in Fig. 2 already indicate that, in line with game-the-
oretic  considerations12, both younger and older adults frequently left fields empty when they were in the role 
of the weaker player. For a more fine-grained quantitative analysis, we examined the proportion of fields left 
empty, which is a key indicator of strategic allocation behavior in this  game15,29. Figure 3 presents the results for 
the two age groups in the symmetric and asymmetric conditions (panels a and b, respectively). Two findings 
are evident from Fig. 3 and were supported by a 2 (age group) × 2 (available resources) × 2 (opponent strength) 
factorial ANOVA: First, participants from both age groups were clearly sensitive to their relative strengths, leav-
ing more fields empty when they had 48 points and were the weaker player than when they had 48 points 
and their strength was equal to that of their opponent. The interaction between available resources and oppo-
nent strength was significant, F(1, 116) = 60.34, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.34, 95% CI = [0.21, 0.46]. Second, this effect was 
stronger among younger than older adults, as indicated by a three-way interaction between age group, available 
resources, and opponent strength, F(1, 116) = 12.40, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.10, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.21]. Younger adults’ 
allocations thus corresponded better to the game-theoretic benchmark than older adults’ allocations did.
There was no significant main effect of age group, F(1, 116) = 2.93, p = 0.090, and no interaction between age 
group and opponent strength (F < 1), but there was a significant interaction between age group and available 
resources, F(1, 116) = 8.18, p = 0.005, η2p = 0.07, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.17]. Unsurprisingly, the main effects of available 
resources, F(1, 116) = 96.98, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.46, 95% CI = [0.32, 0.56], and of opponent strength, F(1, 116) = 8.56, 
p = 0.004, η2p = 0.07, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.17] were both significant.
Figure 1.  Schematic illustration of a sample trial from the allocation game (Colonel Blotto game). Verbatim 
instructions and details of procedures are provided in the Supplemental Materials. Participants allocated all of 
their resources (units) available in each round (depicted in a jar on the left side of the computer screen) across 
four fields (bins) as they saw fit, by moving corresponding sliders. After their allocation decision, participants 
clicked on a “next” button. In the evaluation phase, one of the four fields was then randomly selected by the 
program for comparison between two opponents. A player’s success was defined by a simple deterministic 
auction function. In the example, Player B wins the round (worth €0.2) against Player A, because Player B 
allocated more resources to that field than Player A did (29 vs. 28 units).
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Figure 2.  Proportions of allocations of a specific number of points on a field across the game for opponents 
of equal (symmetric) or unequal (asymmetric) strength, with either 48 or 96 points available. The upper two 
panels show simulated draws from game-theoretically optimal play and from random play with 48 points (panel 
a) or 96 points (panel b). The other panels plot the observed allocations of younger and older adults for Study 
1 (homogeneous age groups; panels c and d) and Study 2 (mixed age groups; panels e and f) as a function of 
available points and opponent strength. For the simulations in panels a and b, we generated independent draws 
from distributions under optimal and random play (with n = 2000 and n = 4000 draws for the symmetric and 
asymmetric conditions, respectively, corresponding with the actual number of observations in each study). 
Random play implies that the opponents allocate their m available points unsystematically across k fields with 





 for a given field.
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Follow-up tests indicated that in symmetric competition, the proportion of empty fields did not differ between 
younger and older adults, F(1, 38) = 1.30, p = 0.261. In asymmetric competition, when they were the weaker player, 
younger adults left more fields empty than older adults, t(75.51) = 3.15, p = 0.002, d = 0.70, 95% CI = [0.25, 1.15]; 
when they were the stronger player, younger adults left fewer fields empty than older adults, t(67.96) =  − 2.25, 
p = 0.028, d =  − 0.50, 95% CI = [− 0.95, − 0.05]. This pattern is consistent with the decline-in-strategic-cognition 
hypothesis.
In terms of game-theoretic benchmarks, when they were the weaker player in asymmetric competi-
tion, younger adults left slightly fewer than 50% fields empty, t(39) =  − 2.04, p = 0.049, d =  − 0.32, 95% 
CI = [− 0.64, − 0.002], and older adults left substantially fewer than 50% fields empty, t(39) =  − 5.79, p < 0.001, 
d =  − 0.92, 95% CI = [− 1.28, − 0.54].
In both studies, we also examined further measures of strategic allocation (the coefficient of variation). More-
over, we analyzed the fields that participants left empty with a generalized logistic mixed-modeling approach. 
The results of these additional analyses are reported in the Supplemental Materials and are in line with the 
findings reported here.
Figure 3.  Strategic allocations (mean proportion of fields left empty) by younger and older adults in the 
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Achieved wins. When players have equal resources in symmetric competition in the zero-sum Colonel Blotto 
game, the average proportion of rounds won is by definition 0.50 (see 29). Therefore, in Study 1, it was only possi-
ble to examine age differences in wins for the asymmetric condition. Actual wins did not differ between younger 
and older adults (see Table 2). Regarding game-theoretically expected wins, when the players differ in strength, 
the weaker player should win half of the battles on fields not left  empty12. Thus, weaker players (with 48 points) 
are expected to win 25% and stronger players (with 96 points) 75% of the rounds in the present study, if they 
follow game-theoretic prescriptions. Notably, people’s actual wins did not differ significantly from the expected 
wins in either age group in the asymmetric condition: all ts(39) < 1.36, all ps > 0.183. This result indicates that, 
regardless of age, people’s wins were in line with game-theoretic predictions.
Relation between wins and allocations. We further examined the relation between players’ wins and their allo-
cations. As expected, the relation between rounds won and fields left empty depended on the type of competition 
(see Supplemental Materials for details): In asymmetric competitions, the relation between wins and fields left 
empty was moderately positive for weaker players, but negative for stronger players. In symmetric competitions, 
both relations were moderately negative. Thus, allocation strategies that covered all fields tended to yield benefi-
cial outcomes for stronger players in both symmetric and asymmetric competition, but detrimental outcomes 
for weaker players in asymmetric competition.
Individual-difference measures. To what extent are strategy use and success in the competition game correlated 
with individual cognitive abilities, numeracy, risk preferences, and social value orientation? To address this ques-
tion, we examined the intercorrelations between the fields left empty, achieved wins, and participants’ scores 
from psychometric tests (a) within the symmetric and asymmetric conditions and (b) within each age group, 
respectively (details are in Supplement 1). In the asymmetric conditions, numeracy and fluid cognitive abili-
ties (cognitive speed and reasoning) correlated positively with wins in the game (by both stronger and weaker 
players) and with the fields left empty by weaker players—but negatively with the fields left empty by stronger 
players. Thus, participants who scored higher on these cognitive variables left more fields empty in the role of 
weaker players and covered more fields as stronger players (rs > 0.17, ps < 0.03). In the symmetric conditions, the 
patterns were less systematic (only the correlation between reasoning and wins with 48 points reached signifi-
cance). When the correlations were examined separately within each age group, cognitive speed and numeracy 
correlated with older adults’ allocation behavior in asymmetric competition (the fields left empty by older adults 
as the weaker players; rs > 0.29, ps < 0.01), but in younger adults, these correlations failed to reach significance.
Overall, this suggests that fluid cognitive and numerical abilities are relevant predictors of strategic decisions, 
particularly in asymmetric competition. The correlational analyses are also in line with the declining-strategic-
cognition hypothesis Strategic allocation behavior (within the age groups) tended to correlate with measures of 
fluid and numerical abilities; these measures, in turn, differed strongly between age groups (Table 2).
Study 2
In Study 2, we investigated the role of opponent age. Rising through professional and social hierarchies takes 
time. The higher echelons of society thus tend to be populated by older  people1, who interact strategically with 
people of a similar age, but also with people who are likely younger. Therefore, is strategic game play shaped 
by mismatch in players’ age? Three scenarios are conceivable: First, players of both age groups could play more 
strategically (allocate resources more competitively) against opponents from another age group than from their 
own age group. This pattern would be consistent with the idea that the similarity of an opponent (shared category 
membership) may attenuate the urge for  competition30,31. Second, players of both age groups might generally play 
more strategically against younger than older adults, following shared norms of how one should interact with 
members of different age groups (e.g.,32) or stereotypical expectations that younger adults act more strategically 
than older  adults33. This pattern would be evident in more strategic play of older adults and a deterioration in 
the play of younger adults relative to Study 1. Third, it is possible that age mismatch has no distinct influence 
on behavior in the game. Finally, the experimental setting in Study 2 allowed us to analyze the wins by different 
age groups also in symmetric competition, in contrast to Study 1 (where wins in symmetric competition were, 
by definition, 50% within each group).
Method. Participants and procedures. In Study 2, 60 younger and 60 older adults (who did not take part 
in Study 1) participated for monetary compensation. Information about the sample is provided in Tables 1 and 
2. The design, materials, and procedures were the same as in Study 1, with one important exception: Each ses-
sion involved groups of two younger and two older adults. Participants were informed that they would compete 
against players of a different age group.
Results. Allocation of resources. As shown Fig. 2, the allocation distributions in Study 2 (opponents of dif-
ferent age; panels e–f) were relatively similar to those in Study 1 (opponents of similar age; panels c–d), sug-
gesting again that both younger and older adults were attuned to their opponent’s strength—but less so to their 
opponent’s age. Next, we report further analyses on the proportion of fields left empty and of wins in the game.
Proportion of fields left empty. Figure 3(panels c, d) shows that both age groups were attuned to their own and 
their opponent’s strength: The interaction effect between available resources and opponent strength was signifi-
cant, F(1, 116) = 48.45, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.30, 95% CI = [0.16, 0.41]. However, the three-way interaction between 
available resources, opponent strength, and age now failed to reach significance, F(1, 116) = 3.07, p = 0.083. There 
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was no significant main effect of age group, F(1, 116) = 1.80, p = 0.183, and no interaction between age group and 
opponent strength (F < 1) or between age group and available resources F(1, 116) = 2.22, p = 0.139. Once again, 
the main effects of opponent strength, F(1, 116) = 13.19, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.10, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.21], and available 
resources, F(1, 116) = 90.60, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.44, 95% CI = [0.31, 0.54], were both significant.
Follow-up tests indicated that, in symmetric competition, the proportion of empty fields did not differ 
between younger and older adults, F(1, 38) = 1.60, p = 0.213. In asymmetric competition, when they were the 
weaker players, the age groups did not differ in the proportion of fields left empty, t(78) = 1.03, p = 0.305; in the 
role of the stronger player, younger adults left fewer fields empty than older adults, t(57.88) = 3.38, p = 0.001, 
d =  − 0.76, 95% CI = [− 1.21, − 0.29]. Both age groups left fewer than 50% of fields empty when they were the 
weaker player, ts(39) > 4.17, ps < 0.001, ds > 0.65.
Wins. Study 2 allowed for a direct comparison of wins when older adults played against younger adults in both 
symmetric and asymmetric competition: Younger adults achieved significantly more wins than older adults, 
except in symmetric competitions with 96 points (see Table 2).
Comparisons of game-theoretically expected and actual wins revealed that younger adults achieved more wins 
than expected in symmetric competition with 48 points, t(19) = 2.41, p = 0.026, d = 0.54, 95% CI = [0.06, 1.00], and 
in asymmetric competition with 96 points, t(39) = 2.25, p = 0.030, d = 0.35, 95% CI = [0.03, 0.67]. Correspond-
ingly, older adults achieved fewer wins than expected with 48 points in symmetric and asymmetric competition.
The effect of opponent’s age. To examine if and how an opponent’s age affected strategic allocation decisions, 
we compared the proportion of fields left empty in Study 2 (age discordance) with Study 1 (age concordance; 
Supplement 4 provides details). The effect of opponent age was nonsignificant, F(1, 232) = 1.74, p = 0.189. How-
ever, there was an interaction between players’ age and opponent age, F(1,232) = 4.73, p = 0.031 , η2p = 0.02, 95% 
CI = [0.00, 0.07]: Younger adults left fewer fields empty when playing against older opponents than when playing 
against opponents of the same age, F(1, 116) = 7.40, p = 0.008, η2p = 0.06, 95% CI = [0.004, 0.16]. In contrast, older 
adults left as many fields empty in both situations (F < 1). There were no further interactions involving oppo-
nent age (all Fs < 1.21; ps > 0.271). In sum, the analyses showed, first, that players did not act more strategically 
when playing against opponents of different age than they did when playing against opponents of similar age 
(the interaction between available resources, opponent strength, and opponent age was nonsignificant, F < 1). 
Second, players did not generally act more strategically against younger than older opponents (older adults’ 
strategic allocations were similar when playing against same-age and different-age opponents). Third, opponent 
age did affect strategic behavior in younger adults, who left fewer fields empty (and thus acted less strategically 
in asymmetric competition) when playing against older than younger opponents. Nonetheless, younger adults 
won more frequently than older adults in Study 2.
General discussion
Competitors in the real world have limited and different amounts of resources available to achieve their goals 
(e.g.,29,34). For a good reason, research has linked strategic allocation of resources to success in many contexts, 
including economic, political, and military  competition11,13,14. The current findings contribute to this research 
by investigating how aging and declining cognitive abilities may interfere with the ability to strategize when 
mustering one’s resources for a competitive situation. Our goal was to better understand age-related differences 
in strategic behavior and to examine the dynamics of competition when opponents hold different amounts of 
resources or are from different or similar age cohorts. We found that both younger and older adults acted strate-
gically and left fields uncontested as the weaker opponents, quite closely following game-theoretic benchmarks. 
Younger adults nevertheless made strategically more successful allocations than older adults. Moreover, the 
strategic decisions of older adults were not affected by the age of their opponent; younger adults, in contrast, 
acted less strategically when they competed against older opponents.
These findings inform and integrate several lines of research. They inform research on the aging decision 
maker (e.g.,22,23,35) by demonstrating for the first time in the context of strategic interpersonal competition that 
both younger and older adults adaptively select strategies as a function of the resource environment they face 
(cf.36). This is not at odds with previous findings that older people may act more cautiously, are less prone to 
taking risks (e.g.,24), and exercise motivational selectivity (e.g.,26,27,37,38). Rather, in the game we studied, strategic 
cognition (in interaction with situational factors) took precedence over preferences such as risk aversion and 
cautiousness. Consistent with this, participants’ strategic allocations did not correlate with individual measures 
of value  orientation39 or risk  taking40 in the present studies. We note, however, that the relations among measures 
of risk taking and between chronological age and risk taking are generally complex. Correlations among different 
behavioral measures of risk-taking are usually small and task-specific variance is  high41. Moreover, older adults 
typically indicate lower levels of risk taking than younger adults in self  reports24, but the pattern is different in 
behavioral decision  tasks42,43. Specifically, when risky decisions are made from  description44,45 (as in the  lotteries40 
we used here to measure risk taking) there are no systematic age-related  differences42,46,47. Taken together, the 
lack of correlations between strategic allocations in the game and risk taking is not at odds with prior research, 
but calls for a nuanced analysis of different aspects of risk taking in competitive environments.
Older players, like younger players, displayed the skill to act strategically. However, consistent with the declin-
ing-strategic-cognition hypothesis, we found age-related differences in strategic behavior along with moderate 
relations between older adults’ strategic behavior and their fluid cognitive and numerical abilities. This echoes 
research from other areas of decision making, which has shown that cognitive and numerical abilities account 
for age differences in the quality of  decisions19–21,48. In the present studies, younger adults achieved more wins 
in competition and came closer to game-theoretic benchmarks than older adults. However, compared with the 
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large effects of environmental factors (available resources and opponent strength) on competitive decisions, the 
role of cognitive decline was small. Specifically, we found that the environmental factors (and their interactions) 
together accounted for ca. 30% of the variance in people’s strategic allocations whereas chronological age (and 
interactions with age) accounted for ca. 3% of the variance. This highlights that younger and older adults are by 
and large competent competitors capable to adapt to circumstances at hand. It is possible that in competitions 
outside the laboratory, older adults may even retain a competitive edge through their accumulated knowledge 
or the skilled use of heuristic strategies (e.g.,49,50) that are well attuned to information-rich  environments36. For 
example, experience (crystallized abilities) can help older adults to compensate for age-related decline in fluid 
abilities to make similarly good economic decisions as younger  adults51. Thus, more work is needed to find out 
whether the age differences in strategic allocations observed here will generalize beyond the commonly abstract 
and context-free paradigms studied in experimental economics and game  theory52. Whereas several  studies53–55 
suggest that strategic decisions in the laboratory generalize well to naturalistic field settings (for further discus-
sion,  see56), there is also evidence that the specific framing of a problem may strongly affect decision makers’ 
reasoning and  strategies57–59. In a study with university students, different content descriptions in the Blotto 
game had no effect on wins, but on people’s  allocations15. It remains to be seen how younger and older adults 
compete in differently framed domains, in which individual experience or propensities could play different roles.
Older players’ decisions were similar, regardless of their opponents’ age; younger players, in contrast, acted less 
strategically against older than same-age opponents. This suggests that shared category membership alone does 
not attenuate the sense of competition (e.g.,31,32). Rather, younger adults may operate according to certain norms 
(e.g., “don’t exploit older people”) or expectations (e.g., “older players won’t compete as fiercely”) pertaining to 
older adults (cf.33,60). Perhaps consistent with this possibility, we found that measures of other-regarding prefer-
ences and social value  orientation39 tended to be higher in younger than in older adults (Table 2). Clearly, further 
research is needed to better understand the relation between measures of prosocial and competitive  orientation3.
Conclusion
Many important decisions are made by people who are relatively old. A better understanding of age differences 
in allocation decisions is important because they affect outcomes in economic and other competitions, in which 
resources are often asymmetrically distributed. Younger adults made strategically more successful allocations 
than older adults and strategic performance in older adults correlated with measures of fluid abilities. At the same 
time, our research demonstrates that younger and older players can decide, intuitively, in ways that approximate 
sophisticated game-theoretic solutions and highlights the ability of younger as well as older adults to reach good 
decisions—even in complex David-Goliath competitions.
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